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ABSTRACT
The United States Supreme Court recently confirmed
the importance of the patent eligible subject matter inquiry
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 when assessing whether a claimed
invention (“claim”) is patentable in Mayo Collaborative
Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. The Court also
stressed that patents will not be issued to a claim that
simply recites a law of nature unless there are additional
steps that ensure the claim is sufficiently tailored to not
preempt further use of the natural law. The Court’s
decision shocked the patent law community. However,
decisions by lower courts since have demonstrated that
Prometheus has not dramatically altered the landscape of
patent eligibility analysis, though it has deeply impacted
cases involving diagnostic medical therapeutic techniques.
While the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit remains
split as to how narrowly it will read Prometheus, its
forthcoming en banc opinion in CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice
Corp. Pty. Ltd. will likely unify its interpretation of the
case. In the meantime, following the lower court cases is
the best approach to understanding how the patent law
landscape has changed since the landmark case.
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INTRODUCTION
The United States’ patent system incentivizes investment in
discoveries that will benefit our society by ensuring that rightful
inventors possess “the exclusive Right to their respective . . .
Discoveries” for a certain period of time. 1 However, patent laws
are also crafted to prevent patents from being granted when such
patents would stifle scientific and technological progress. For that
reason, a claimed invention must consist of patentable subject
matter 2 and be novel, 3 nonobvious, 4 and fully and particularly
described. 5
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, a patentable innovation is “any new
and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of

1
2
3
4
5

U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
35 U.S.C. § 102.
35 U.S.C. § 103.
35 U.S.C. § 112.
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matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof.” 6 The United
States Supreme Court has held that the use of “any” to modify such
broad terms in § 101 demonstrated that Congress had
“contemplated that patent laws would be given [a] wide scope.”7
Arguably the United States Patent and Trademark Office has
previously considered § 101 to be a mere formality8 and this
provision has seldom been the basis for rejecting a patent
application, unless one of the judicially created exceptions
applied. 9 Indeed, the judicially created exceptions to § 101—for
claims that seek to patent “laws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” 10—have historically been the sole basis for
rejecting a claim under § 101. Granting a patent to a claim falling
within any of these three categories would “impede innovation
more than it would tend to promote it” by preventing the free use
of basic scientific and technological tools. 11
In March 2012, however, the Supreme Court held in Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc. that a
§ 101 patentability analysis is the threshold inquiry in any
determination of whether a patent is valid, and that a claim must
contain a patent eligible concept to pass this threshold inquiry.
Despite initial apprehension among commentators and
practitioners that Prometheus would radically alter patent law,
opinions by lower courts indicate that the case is being read
narrowly so as to simply reiterate prior Supreme Court
jurisprudence. The question remains open whether the United
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit will embrace or
cabin the Prometheus holding. Section I of this Article summarizes
6

35 U.S.C. § 101.
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010) (quoting
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 308 (1980).
8
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S.
___, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1304 (2012) (explaining that the government believes
other patent law provisions besides 35 U.S.C. § 101 can perform the screening
function of that provision).
9
See Denise DeFranco, Mayo: A Force to Be Reckoned With, 4 LANDSLIDE
24, 28 (2012).
10
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 185 (1981).
11
Prometheus, 566 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. at 1293 (quoting Gottschalk v
Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
7
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the case history and the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Prometheus.
Section II discusses how lower courts’ interpretations of
Prometheus have affected the patent eligibility landscape.
I. MAYO COLLABORATIVE SERVICES V. PROMETHEUS
LABORATORIES, INC.
In Prometheus, the Supreme Court considered whether a
method for optimizing the dosage of a drug constituted patentable
subject matter and found that in this particular case it was not.
After reaching this conclusion, the Court reaffirmed that the
“machine or transformation test” previously espoused by the
Federal Circuit was not solely determinative of patent eligibility,
and rejected attempts by the patent law community and the U.S.
government to render § 101 a mere formality in assessing a
claim. 12 As will be discussed below, it is debatable whether this
analysis was pertinent to the holding or merely dictum.
A. History of the Case
At issue in the case were Prometheus’s patent claims directed
to a method of optimizing the dosage of thiopurine drugs, which
are used to treat Crohn’s disease. 13 The claims first directed a
medical professional to administer the thiopurine drug to the
patient. 14 Then, they suggested that the medical professional
measure the level of thioguanine metabolites in the patient’s
blood. 15 Finally, in light of the level of the thioguanine metabolites
found in the patient’s blood, the claims directed that the dosage of
thiopurine be adjusted according to Prometheus’s guidelines to
achieve an optimal dosage. 16 Mayo Clinic Rochester and Mayo
Collaborative Services used Prometheus’s patented test until 2004
when it announced its intention to sell its own, slightly different

12

Id. at 1304.
U.S. Patent No. 6,355,623, col.20, 1l.10 20, 2 App. 16.
14
Prometheus, 566 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. at 1295.
15
Id.
16
Id.
13
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version of the test. 17 Prometheus subsequently sued for patent
infringement. 18
The district court agreed with Mayo that Prometheus’s patent
was ineligible because it sought to patent laws of nature,
specifically the correlation between metabolite and the efficacy
and dangers of thiopurine dosages. 19
The Federal Circuit reversed, finding that the claim satisfied
the “machine or transformation” test and was sufficiently narrow
in scope. 20 Courts have traditionally applied the “machine or
transformation test” to determine if a claim was patent eligible.
Under this test, a claimed process satisfies § 101 “if (1) it is tied to
a particular machine or apparatus, or (2) it transforms a particular
article into a different state or thing.” 21 In this case, Prometheus’s
claim “involve[d] the transformation of the human body or of
blood taken from the body.” 22
The Supreme Court granted certiorari and then remanded the
case to the Federal Circuit for consideration of the Court’s recent
holding in Bilski v. Kappos. 23 In that case, the Supreme Court held
that the “machine or transformation” test is merely an important
consideration in the § 101 inquiry that is to be used as a secondary
tool only after assessing the claim in light of prior precedent. 24
Even in light of Bilski, the Federal Circuit again found
Prometheus’s claim to be patent eligible because it did “not
encompass laws of nature or preempt natural correlations.” 25 The
Supreme Court then granted certiorari once more in Prometheus. 26

17

Id. at 1295–96.
Id. at 1296.
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3224 (2010) (citations
omitted).
22
Prometheus, 566 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. at 1296 (quoting Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Services, 581 F.3d 1336, 1339 (Fed.
Cir. 2009), cert. granted, judgment vacated, 130 S. Ct. 3543 (2010)).
23
Id. at 1296.
24
Bilski, 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. at 3226.
25
Prometheus, at 1355.
26
Id. at 1296.
18
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B. The Supreme Court Finds Prometheus’s Claim Patent
Ineligible under § 101
The Supreme Court began its opinion with two premises that
underlie the patent system. First, judicially created exceptions for
laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are implicit
in 35 U.S.C. § 101. 27 Claims that fall under these categories are
“‘free to all men and reserved exclusively to none’” 28 since a
patent over laws of nature would “impede innovation more than
. . . promote it.” 29 Second, reading any patent claim too broadly
would prevent any patent from being issued. After all, most
innovations “at some level embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply
laws of nature, natural phenomenon, or abstract ideas.” 30 These
principles underscore the tension of patent eligibility and the patent
law system as a whole.
After discussing the history of the case, the Court began its
analysis of Prometheus’s claims by stating that neither a law of
nature nor a process of simply applying a law of nature is
patentable “unless that process has additional features that provide
practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the law of nature itself.” 31 To be patent
eligible under § 101, a claim based on a law of nature must contain
additional steps that either individually or collectively contain a
patent-eligible concept. 32
The Court examined each of the three steps of Prometheus’s
patent claim individually as well as collectively to determine if the
claim simply applied a law of nature or contained a sufficiently
innovative application of this law of nature. 33 The correlation
between the proper dosage of thiopurine and the level of
thioguanine metabolites in a patient’s blood stream was held to be

27

Id. at 1293.
Id. (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)).
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 1297.
32
Id. at 1293, 1297.
33
Id. at 1297–98.
28
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a natural law. 34 The administration of the drug was a step targeted
to physicians; however, the Court had previously held that simply
“limit[ing] the use of the formula to a particular technology
environment” is insufficient to patent an abstract idea. 35 The Court
also held that the next step in the claim—reminding the physicians
of the pertinent correlation—merely stated a law of nature. 36 The
final claimed step—using any method to determine the relevant
metabolite levels in the patient’s bloodstream and adjust the
dosage of thioguanine given to the patient—required physicians to
use “well-understood, routine, conventional activity previously
engaged in by researchers in the field.” 37 Finally, considering all
the steps together added nothing to the law of nature, and thus the
claim simply recited a law of nature and was patent ineligible. 38
C. Dictum: Refusing to Change § 101 Jurisprudence
Having determined that Prometheus’s claim was not patent
eligible under §101, the remainder of the opinion is arguably
dictum. 39 In the first portion of the dictum, the Court situated
Prometheus within the context of its prior holdings. 40 In Diamond
v. Diehr, 41 the Court held that a process for molding raw rubber
into a cured, molded rubber product was patentable where a
mathematical equation was integrated into the process by
additional steps, which did not “pre-empt the use of [the]
equation.” 42 In Parker v. Flook, 43 a claim for establishing the
34

Id. at 1297.
Id. (quoting Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3230
(2010)).
36
Id. at 1297–98.
37
Id. at 1294.
38
Id. at 1298.
39
Id. (beginning at section II(B), the Court wrote “a more detailed
consideration of the controlling precedents reinforces our conclusion;” II(A)
evaluated the steps of the claim individually and collectively to determine the
claim was not patent eligible).
40
Id. at 1298–1300.
41
450 U.S. 175 (1981).
42
Id. at 187.
43
437 U.S. 584 (1978).
35
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alarm limits of catalytic converters of hydrocarbons was held to
not be patent eligible because the mathematical formula governing
the process was not integrated holistically and did not limit the use
of process in a meaningful manner. Like Flook, Prometheus’s
claim was not patent eligible because its post-solution activity was
obvious or conventional, and therefore did not “transform an
unpatentable principle into a patentable process.” 44 Thus, the
Prometheus claim was found to be “weaker than the (patenteligible) claim in Diehr and no stronger than the (unpatentable)
claim in Flook.” 45
The Court devoted the final section of its opinion to refuting
arguments presented by both Prometheus and the government in its
amicus brief. 46 First, the Court briefly discussed its Bilski holding
that the “machine or transformation” test is an “important and
useful clue,” but not the exclusive test, of whether a claim recites
patentable subject matter. 47 Despite the Federal Circuit’s opinion
to the contrary, the Supreme Court concluded that Prometheus’s
claim did not satisfy the test. 48 This may suggest that courts should
narrowly construe the machine-or-transformation test.
Next, the Court rejected Prometheus’s argument that its claim
involved a very “narrow and specific” law of nature, and that
granting a patent would therefore not substantially interfere with
innovation. 49 Prior cases have not turned on whether a claim seeks
to patent a narrow or broad law of nature because judges are ill
suited “to distinguish among different laws of nature.” 50 Instead,
the Court has embraced a bright-line rule: a claim that simply
directs a natural law or formula to be applied is not patent eligible
because it would preempt the use of the natural law or abstract idea
and preclude further discovery. 51 Although the law of nature at
issue in Prometheus was very narrow in scope, the claim
44

Id. at 590.
Prometheus, 566 U.S. ___, 132 S.Ct. at 1299.
46
Id. at 1300–05.
47
Id. at 1303.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 1301 (discussing Bilski, which held that no patent may be issued for
either the abstract idea of “hedging” or a formula).
45
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potentially foreclosed future innovation in this specific area and
was therefore patent ineligible. 52 This is an example of the
preemption premise identified as the beginning of the opinion.
The Court rejected attempts to diminish the importance of a §
101 analysis in assessing patent claims. 53 The government argued
that any step beyond stating a law of nature should satisfy the
patent eligibility standard of § 101. 54 Effectively, the government
wanted patent eligibility to be evaluated by novelty, 55 nonobviousness, 56 and full-and-particular-description 57 inquiries
alone. 58 The Court rejected this argument, because such a shift
“would make the ‘law of nature’ exception to §101 patentability a
dead letter.” 59
The Court concluded by noting that the balancing between
incentivization of scientific discovery by granting patents and
inhibition of scientific discoveries by the misuse of patents may
differ from field to field. 60 However, only Congress, not the
Court, may create specifically tailored patent rules that provide
“increased protection for discoveries of diagnostic laws of nature”
if it is deemed to be in society’s best interest. 61
Despite addressing various important questions about § 101,
the Court’s holding appeared to be limited to Prometheus’s claim.
The remainder of the opinion reiterates Supreme Court
jurisprudence in this area and declines to adopt the new positions
put forth by the parties and the government.
II. REVOLUTIONIZING PATENT LAW OR CONFIRMING
EXISTING CASES?
The patent law community was generally shocked by the
52

Id. at 1302–03.
Id. at 1303.
54
Id.
55
35 U.S.C. § 102 (2012).
56
35 U.S.C. § 103.
57
35 U.S.C. § 112.
58
Prometheus, 566 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. at 1303-04.
59
Id. at 1303.
60
Id. at 1305.
61
Id.
53
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Court’s decision in Prometheus and numerous law review articles
have been written on the decision in just over a year. 62 Many
people were concerned that Prometheus would radically change
the landscape of patent law. 63 However, lower courts’ uses of
Prometheus have generally indicated the contrary. This section
first discusses how lower courts have interpreted Prometheus to
merely reaffirm prior precedents and then discusses new changes
brought about by Prometheus.

62

See, e.g., Veronica Lambillotte, Comment, An Overview of Patentable
Subject Matter and the Effect of Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 63 CASE W. RES. L. REVIEW 635 (2012); Eric Rogers, Note,
Patenting Medical Diagnostic Methods: The Mort Strikes Back, 17 J. TECH. L. &
POL’Y 111 (2012); Nathan Reed, Comment, A New Metric to Determine Patent
Eligible Subject Matter for Medical Methods, 16 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 321
(2012); Scott Frederick Peachman, The Patent Eligibility of Diagnostic Methods
After Prometheus: A Redefined Test for Transformation, 22 HEALTH MATRIX
589 (2013); Harvard Law Review Ass’n, Diagnostic Method Patents and Harms
to Follow-On Innovation, 126 Harv. L. Rev. 1370 (2013); Bernard Chao,
Colloquy Essay, Moderating Mayo, 107 NW. U. L. REV. 423 (2012); Stephen
McJohn, Top Tens in 2012: Patent, Trademark, Copyright and Trade Secret
Cases, 11 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 173 (2013); Michael Malecek &
Kenneth Maikish, The Prometheus Effect on Software Patents, 24 No. 6 INTELL.
PROP. & TECH. L.J. 3 (2012); Brian McNamara, Patent Protection of Computer
Hardward and Software, 2 WAKE FOREST J. BUS. & INTELL. PROP. L. 137
(2012); Anna Laakmann, An Explicit Policy Lever For Patent Scope, 19 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 43 (2012); Max Stul Oppenheimer, Patents 101:
Patentable Subject Matter and Separation of Powers, 15 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH.
L. 1 (2012); Guyan Liang, Molecules of Carriers of Biological Information: A
Chemist’s Perspectives on the Patentability of Isolated Genes, 22 ALB. L.J. SCI.
& TECH. 133 (2012); Tiana Leia Russell, Unlocking the Genome: The Legal
Case Against Genetic Diagnostic Patents, 16 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 81
(2012); Johanna Jacob, Should Our Genes Be Part of the Patent Bargain?
Maximizing Access to Medical Diagnostic Advances While Ensuring Research
Remains Profitable, 28 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 403
(2012); Shannon Murphy, Who Is Swimming in Your Gene Pool? Harmonizing
The International Pattern of Gene Patentability to Benefit Patient Care and the
Biotechnology Industry, 89 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 397 (2012).
63
See, e.g., Robert R. Sachs, Punishing Prometheus: The Supreme Court's
Blunders in Mayo v. Prometheus, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 26, 2012),
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2012/03/punishing-prometheus-the-supremecourts-blunders-in-mayo-v-prometheus.html (last visited July 10, 2012).
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A. “Machine or Transformation” Test and Additional Analysis
Reaffirming Prior Precedent
As noted above, the Supreme Court initially remanded
Prometheus to the Federal Circuit for consideration of the claim in
light of its holding in Bilski. The Federal Circuit found that
Prometheus’s claim was still patent eligible under the machine or
transformation test, even though under Bilski this was no longer a
dispositive test. The Supreme Court rejected the Federal Circuit’s
conclusion and found that Prometheus’s claim failed both prongs
of the test. Following the Supreme Court’s ultimate decision in
Prometheus, members of the patent law community have
wondered whether the “machine or transformation test” is still
relevant, or if it has become an afterthought that the Supreme
Court only addressed among its exhaustive rejections of all of
Prometheus’s claims.
Lower courts—including the Federal Circuit—have
consistently, 64 with one exception, 65 assessed a claim in light of
both the “machine or transformation” analysis and additional
elements laid out in Prometheus or prior Supreme Court or circuit
court jurisprudence. The first case to cite Prometheus did not
assess the claim under the “machine or transformation test,” but
this now appears to have been an anomaly. 66 The remaining lower
court cases have applied both the “machine or transformation”
analysis and an additional analysis established under Prometheus
or prior Supreme Court precedence when evaluating whether a
claim has a patentable subject matter. 67 In all cases, both analyses
64

Smartgene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 852 F. Supp. 2d 42
(D.D.C. 2012); Advanced Software Design Corp. v. Fiserv, Inc, 625 F. Supp. 2d
815 (E.D. Mo. 2012); Bancorp Services LLC v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of Can.,
687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Aria Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom Inc., 2012
WL 25999340 (N.D. Cal. 2012).
65
Nazomi Commc’n Inc. v. Samsung Telecomm., 2012 WL 967968, *4
(N.D. Cal. 2012).
66
Id. This may be due to the district court’s finding that the claim was
patent eligible because it contained specific steps that rendered the claim to be
“a specific, useful application.”
67
Smartgene, 852 F. Supp. 2d 42; Fiserv, 2012 WL 1684495; Bancorp
Services, 687 P.3d 1266; Aria Diagnostics, 2012 WL 25999340.
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reached the same conclusion regarding whether a claim was patent
eligible. Thus, the “machine or transformation test” remains an
independent and important, but not solely dispositive, means for
courts to assess patent eligibility.
B. How to Assess Patent Eligibility under § 101
Lower federal courts have interpreted Prometheus in three
ways that reaffirm prior patent eligibility precedent that lower
courts were not always following. First, the district courts in the
District of Columbia and Northern California have cited
Prometheus for the proposition that courts should assess patent
eligibility of claims by carefully analyzing them in light of prior
precedent. 68 This approach was adopted in Bilski by only four
justices, 69 so the unanimous affirmation of this approach in
Prometheus, 70 even if only in dictum, was perhaps necessary to
establish this analysis as the proper approach to such cases.
Second, lower courts have cited Prometheus for how to assess
whether a claim is patent eligible under § 101. 71 In Diehr, the
Supreme Court specifically noted that while steps individually may
not be patent eligible, a new combination of these steps might be.72
Yet, the Prometheus Court was very explicit in its approach of
assessing each step of a claim individually and then considering all
the steps collectively to determine if—after ignoring any aspects of
a claim that simply restated a law of nature—the claim stated a
68

OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 2012 WL 3985118, *4 (N.D. Cal
2012); Smartgene, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 52.
69
Bilski, v. Kappos, 561 U.S. ___, 130, S. Ct. 3218, 3229–31 (2010). The
remaining justices concurred in the result only and not with respect to this
portion of the opinion.
70
Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S.
___, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1300–05 (2012).
71
Smartgene, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 56–57 (D.D.C. 2012); Bancorp Services,
687 F.3d at 1279-80; Cyberfone Sys., LLC v. Cellco P’ship, 885 F. Supp. 2d
710, 716 (D.Del 2012); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent &
Trademark Office, 689 F.3d 1303, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2012); OIP Technologies,
2012 WL 3985118 at *17–18; Classen Immunotherapies, Inc. v. Biogen IDEC,
2012 WL 3264941, *4–5 (D. Md. 2012).
72
Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 (1981).
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patent eligible concept. This approach was implicitly followed in
prior cases, but lower courts appear to cite Prometheus for this
process because it was so explicitly stated. 73
Although the Federal Circuit has followed the Prometheus
approach in two cases, 74 Federal Circuit Judge Prost argued in his
dissent to CLS Bank that the majority—written by Circuit Judge
Linn and joined by Circuit Judge O’Malley—“does not even
attempt to inquire whether the claims disclose anything
inventive.” 75 The majority in CLS Bank claims to have followed
this Prometheus approach by “examining the language of the
claims” 76 and determining that the claim was not “manifestly
abstract” after considering it in light of prior Supreme Court and
Federal Circuit jurisprudence. 77 This case is now being heard en
banc by the Federal Circuit, which may address this strong
disagreement between the majority and dissent regarding whether
the Prometheus approach was followed or simply ignored. The en
banc decision on this issue could either reaffirm this Prometheus
approach to the § 101 analysis or cabin the approach as one of
several possible approaches that a court may take. 78
Finally, although one district court held that Prometheus
established § 101 as the threshold inquiry in any case determining
if a patent was properly issued, the Federal Circuit remains split as
to the holding of the case. Barely a week after the opinion in
Prometheus was issued, the district court for the District of
Columbia held that Prometheus reconfirms that § 101 is the
73

Smartgene, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 56–55; Cyberfone Systems, 2012 WL
3528115, at *8; OIP Technologies, 2012 WL 3985118, at *17–18; Classen
Immunotherapies, 2012 WL 3264941, at *4–5.
74
Bancorp Services, 687 P.3d at 1279 (Lourie, J., joined by Prost and
Wallach, J.) (noting that after setting aside unpatentable aspects of a claim, the
court must determine under § 101 “what additional features remain in the claim”
and referencing Prometheus, 132 S. Ct. at 1297). Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology, 689 F.3d at 1335 (Lourie, J.; Moore, J., concurring; and Bryson, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
75
CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 685 F.3d 1341, 1357, reh'g en
banc granted, opinion vacated, 484 F. App'x 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Prost, J.,
dissenting).
76
Id. at 1352, n.2.
77
Id. at n.3.
78
CLS Bank, 484 F. App'x 559.
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threshold inquiry for any patent case. 79 This district court noted the
Federal Circuit’s resistance to the Supreme Court’s previous
determination of § 101 as at least a threshold determination. In
Bilski, the nine justices of the Supreme Court agreed that “§ 101
patent-eligibility inquiry is only a threshold test,” 80 and that a
claim must also be novel, nonobvious, and fully and particularly
described, 81 but there was no strong indication that § 101 must be
addressed first. Following Bilski, the Federal Circuit had
previously expressed doubt about the absoluteness of § 101 as a
threshold inquiry. 82 Indeed, the Federal Circuit has directed courts
and litigants to first address patent invalidity with respect to the
simpler-to-consider patentability defenses in §§ 102, 103, or 112. 83
By noting that Prometheus held—in dictum—that § 101 was a
threshold inquiry and then applying § 101 as such, this district
court implicitly rejected the Federal Circuit’s prior approach and
interpreted Prometheus to reaffirm Bilski’s holding that § 101 is a
threshold inquiry.
However, in July 2012, the Federal Circuit effectively cabined
the use of the § 101 analysis as a threshold inquiry in CLS Bank. 84
Circuit Judge Linn, writing for the majority, noted that Prometheus
established that §§ 101, 102, 103, and 112 each “serves a different
purpose and plays a different role.” 85 Because a district court is
“master of its own docket,” it can choose which provision to apply
first in determining whether a patent is valid. 86 Thus, the Federal
Circuit did not treat Prometheus as requiring that § 101 analysis be
the threshold inquiry that must be addressed first. Perhaps, as this
79

Smartgene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 852 F. Supp. 2d 42,
52-52 (D.D.C. 2012).
80
Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3225 (2010).
81
35 U.S.C. § 101 (2012). The other requirements are that a claim is novel,
nonobvious, and fully and particularly described; Bilski, 130 S. Ct. at 3225.
82
Smartgene, 852 F. Supp. 2d at 51 (citing MySpace, Inc. v. GraphOn
Corp., 672 F.3d 1250, 1260 (internal citations omitted)).
83
Id.
84
CLS Bank Int'l v. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd., 685 F.3d 1341, 1348, reh'g en
banc granted, opinion vacated, 484 F. App'x 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
85
Id. at 1348 (citing Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1303–04 (2012)).
86
Id.
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article suggests, the Federal Circuit felt that this portion of the
Supreme Court’s opinion was merely dictum. Circuit Justice Prost
in dissent strongly disagreed and faulted his fellow judges for
“creat[ing] an entirely new framework that in effect allows courts
to avoid evaluating patent eligibility under § 101 whenever they so
desire,” 87 even after the Supreme Court “hint[ed] (not so tacitly)
that [the Federal Circuit’s] subject matter patentability test is not
sufficiently exacting.” 88 As noted above, the Federal Circuit is
currently rehearing this case en banc and may address this issue. 89
For now, however, it remains unclear whether the Federal Circuit
will interpret Prometheus as limited to the facts of that case or
having further-reaching implications for § 101 analysis.
C. Redefining Patentability for Diagnostic Medical
Method Claims
Prometheus has been more fully analyzed in two cases
regarding biomedical patents. First, in Smartgene, Inc. v. Advanced
Biological Laboratories, the District Court for the District of
Columbia concluded that patents regarding “the system, method,
and computer program for guiding the selection of therapeutic
treatment regimes for complex disorders” were not patent
eligible. 90 The court closely summarized Benson, Flook, Diehr,
Bilski and Prometheus 91 before framing Smartgene’s claims as
situated identically to those in Prometheus, between the Flook and
Diehr claims. 92 That is, Smartgene’s claims were not patent
eligible because they merely restated abstract ideas regarding how
physicians diagnose patients. 93
Second, in Association for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office, the Federal Circuit examined the
87

Id. at 1356.
Id. (citing Prometheus, 566 U.S. ___, 132 S. Ct. 1289 and Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. ___, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010).
89
CLS Bank, 484 F. App'x 559 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (rehearing en banc).
90
Smartgene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 852 F. Supp. 2d 42,
45 (D.D.C. 2012).
91
Id. at 52–55.
92
Id. at 55.
93
Id.
88

570

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 8:5

patentability of several claims, the most relevant being diagnostic
“method claims for comparing or analyzing isolated DNA
sequences associated with predisposition of breast and ovarian
cancers.” 94 The Federal Circuit closely compared the situation to
that in Prometheus when assessing the patent eligibility of this
method patent claim. 95 The court held that the claims’ steps
comparing breast cancer DNA sequences from patients with
control DNA sequences was similar to the administering and
determining steps in Prometheus. 96 This portion of the claim was
held to be patent ineligible. 97
Collectively, the latter two cases indicate that any method
claims that personalize medical treatment through comparison of a
patient’s symptoms or naturally occurring DNA sequences to a
standard treatment mechanism or standard DNA sequence will not
be patent eligible. It is instructive that in Association for Molecular
Pathology, the Federal Circuit expressly held that Prometheus does
not govern portions of the claims relating to transformed DNA
sequences and transformed host cells. 98 Both claims were found to
be novel compositions of matter by the majority. 99 Based on these
cases, it seems that companies seeking to patent claims regarding
personalized medicine will do best if they have a physically
transformed product derived from the patient to guide treatment.

94

Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 689
F.3d 1303, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2012).
95
Id. at 1335.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
Id. at 1331–37.
99
Id. at 1303 (holding that Prometheus does not impact the court’s analysis
regarding whether isolated DNA sequences were patent ineligible as natural
components; however, Circuit Judge Bryson dissented and argued that “mere
incidental changes to a naturally occurring product,” like mere incidental
changes to an abstract idea, do not result in a patent eligible claim). This
analysis may change, as the Supreme Court has granted certiorari in this case.
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 694 (2012)
(granting certiorari).
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CONCLUSION
Despite concern within the patent community, Prometheus has
not radically changed the landscape of § 101 jurisprudence, and
instead has been read as generally reaffirming prior cases.
Prometheus may have established that § 101 is the threshold
analysis in that case, but it is unclear how broadly lower courts will
apply that portion of the case, which is arguably dictum. The
Federal Circuit’s en banc holding in CLS Bank will be instructive
in how it, and perhaps district courts, will read Prometheus.
Nonetheless, critics do appear to be correct that Prometheus has
had a strong impact on courts’ view of method claims regarding
personalized medical techniques and will likely continue to pose a
great challenge to patentability of these types of claims.
PRACTICE POINTERS


Evaluate a claim under both the preemption analysis and
“machine or transformation” analysis.



Address first whether a patent claim contains an innovative
concept in claims elements that does not relate to a law of
nature or natural phenomena and thus passes the § 101
threshold inquiry before turning to other statutory
requirements. Emphasize the significance of these elements
in the specification. However, be prepared to address the
statutory requirements during patent prosecution and in any
order during oral arguments.



Include claims of varying scope, ranging from those that
clearly meet the above patent eligibility test to those that
may not meet it. The case law has not established the
threshold test for patent eligibility. Be prepared for the
threshold analysis to change as the case law develops. If
claims are rejected, file a continuation application for
allowed claims and appeal with respect to rejected claims
in case the threshold test is changed during the prosecution.



Consider using reexamination as a means to amend a patent
claim to include an additional step(s) that contain an
innovative concept that will render it patent eligible.
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Note that other countries may have more generous
approach for patent eligibility. For example, the European
Patent Office allowed Prometheus’s claims without any
eligibility question.

